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How Strange the Change 
from Major to Minor 
Peter Goodrich*
The celebrated Wits of the MISCELLENARIAN Race, the Essay-
Writers, casual Discoursers, Reflection-Coiners, Meditation-Founders and 
others of the irregular kind of Writers may plead as their particular 
Advantage ‘That they follow the Variety of NATURE’ (Shaftesbury 
1714: 95).1 
An essay on the minor ought to be short, and yet I hope to fail in 
that as well. My argument will be that minor jurisprudences are in the 
best of senses lifestyles, existential modes of inhabiting institutional 
space, and that they entail an open, plural and expansive thinking. The 
rumination of evoking minorist positions takes patience, care, time. 
So start with a non-definition. The goal of a minor jurisprudence is to 
cut holes in the fabric of law. The minor, aligned to the peripheral, the 
marginal and modal affect in music, if authentic, has to create a site 
of temporary evacuation, by which I mean an avenue of withdrawal 
and return, of exchange, and thereby the expression of a novelty in the 
putatively closed skein of legal rules. It is necessary to tear the seamless 
web. To break the strands that trap and hold the imagination in the 
dead zone of a sticky and immobile lex, the iron cage of a putatively 
comprehensive rule, decision, or other major mode of code. The minor 
rends, and thence performs a rendering through which the excluded, 
the others of law, the laws of others, and in methodological terms the 
peripheral passions, enthusiasms, tones and relationships, movements 
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and moods, potentially intervene as critique in law. What is sought is 
precisely the transitivity of fabrication, the event of spinning the web, 
the practice of making, the invention of the strands that bind and leave 
adrift. There is the goal, the future of the minor, in its alternation of 
the major mode, in the past that was discarded, the practices that were 
denied, the strangers who were kept out. It is necessary first to step 
back, to withdraw a bit, to subtract from, to find a space and so assess 
the connotations of a minor jurisprudence through the concept of its 
minority.
From the Latin minus, minor is smaller, or less, the equivalent 
of parvus. In transitive mode, minuo, means to make smaller, to 
subtract from, but intriguingly the primary meaning in medieval 
Latin is Franciscan Friar, frater minor, while minorissa refers to a nun, 
a minoress, and by extension to humiliation – minorativus and so an 
exclusion, a diminution and dismissal. Finally, minoritas means under 
age, preceding majority.2 It is the latter juristic meaning that is listed, 
for instance, in the Manipulus vocabulorum (Levins 1567: 110.8). The 
lesser, the minor, is attached to the major and as Partridge excavates 
the etymology, it complements magister, from magis, and thus minister 
from minor, as someone who assists in governing ‘a religious cult, a 
public office, finally one at the head of a political department – cf 
“minister of religion” or “of the Crown”’ (958: 406). The trajectory of 
the minor, at least linguistically, is towards the major, the magister 
(the magistrate) but not the maximus because sovereign, state or hieros 
is that from which the lesser, the servant, the official in his officium is 
subtracted and placed. In another variation, ministerialis also leads from 
public official to minstrel and minstrelsy, the music of office, the tone 
of governance, the rhythm of decision. In musical theory the minor 
mode was attached most usually to a softer and more melancholic tone, 
to cantus mollis and by extension, if it is a minor jurisprudence, to ius 
mollis. The beige and brown tones of the Franciscan frater minor, who 
has given up all possessions and all temporal law, who is happy to be 
less than, and withdrawn from, can be heard reflected in the affect of 
the minor modality and keys (Lester 1989).
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It is in that crucible of theologico-juridical meanings that the 
potentiality of minority subsists in the present possibility of taking away 
from, abrogating, suspending, unfinishing. To the monumental quality 
of hierarchy, and to the musical mode of durus, the affect of a harsh and 
inflexible tone, the minor counterposes a modest movement within law, 
away from law, in the resuscitation of lesser writings, a legal scholarship 
with passion and, to coin a term, a jurisprudence of minumenta. The 
term, to be precise, is found in a writ of commission in William West’s 
Symboleography and references a list of diverse testimonies and written 
proofs of ownership (1601: 192 verso).3 The glossographer and barrister 
Thomas Blount lists miniments as the evidences of all kinds of writings 
in the legitimation of legal title, and I would add, now, much later, in 
the making of a juristic point, in the advocacy of the minor, of the rend, 
and of the open (1670: s.v. miniments).4 The minor is the crack in the 
edifice, the fissure in discourse, a site of incompatibility and novelty 
that Foucault more patulously termed the diffraction of discourse.
Oh to go back, to break the self, to collide with an autobiography, 
mine or another, or better a collective autogeny, a generic bios that 
writes, that is thought.5 So I will not retrace my own minor path, the 
tracks of the traceless. I have inhabited the minorist office in my own 
way, in the space of my idiosyncratic fabulations. I have laughed at, 
with, against, and as the law. So where else, where new to start? What 
minstrelsy of beginning, what minor chord will please the horde? The 
answer, for me in my withdrawal, at the point of opening, seems to be 
in childhood, in minority as subtraction from, going back, withdrawing 
so as to redraw, to begin again, to act differently. The technique is that 
of destruam et aedificabo, translated into method as the deliberation on a 
minor past, a past of minority, and its erasure by the affects and forms 
of my major modality. Common lawyers have their inverted version 
of this genre of approach expressed in various versions of the maxim 
in majore summa continentur minor – the greater contains the lesser, 
the major includes, absorbs and governs the minor (Coke: 1611, 5:15). 
The principle has a secondary and more directly political expression in 
the maxim in praesentia majoris potestatis, minor potestas cessat – in the 
presence of a greater power, the lesser power ceases. The higher office 
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carries with it the minor – magus dignum trahit ad se minus dignum 
(Coke 1629: 43). In all of these maxims, and the list could be lengthily 
expanded, the red letter type prolonged, the logic is one of subsumption 
and subordination, the minor is included in the major, the lesser is of 
significance only in becoming part of the greater but is nothing of itself, 
a point made poetically and in extremis, in the familiar and extant legal 
maxim de minimis non curat lex, which reads most usually as trifles, 
affects, little things, unusual acts that can be ignored as lacking legal 
legitimacy, as not being ‘acts in law’.
The consequence of this logic of the greater, of the major premise, is 
that the minor is included in the mode of exclusion. The ex-ceptio, the 
exception in Agamben’s lengthy elaboration is the invariant strategy 
whereby ‘something is divided, excluded, pushed to the bottom, and 
precisely through this exclusion, it is included as archè and foundation’. 
(2015: 264) It is thus not simply that the numerically superior is 
preferred but that the minor has neither jurisdiction nor status in the 
common law tradition: a minor cannot agree, cannot hold property, 
cannot govern, or act as a guardian, and is not to be believed when 
giving evidence without corroboration. Technically the minor is alieni 
iuris, in law but out of law as being in the power of another. Such is 
the view of the minor from the perspective of the major, its inclusive 
exclusion being predicated upon the tutelary status of the origin as 
juvenile, as lacking reason and capacity, as mere fact, inchoate, nascent 
and as yet, not yet. The initial feature of the minor is thus relational, 
what used to be termed dialectical, and resiles upon a looking back, a 
perspective constituted by and in relation to the major and thence the 
maximal as sovereign and sacred.
Minority, and here I borrow, for want of ambition, for loss of 
direction, from Deleuze, ‘minority has no model, it’s a becoming, 
a process’ (1995: 175). It is in this view non-conformist, creative, 
and committed to fabulation. While that challenge to structure and 
to dogma is important, I am initially more interested in taking up 
the opening, the site and space of the minor as the point of internal 
contestation of doctrine, the alien within, the foetus in the heart of the 
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present. From the perspective of the master and the major, of the old, 
of the law, minority is disempowered, fickle, unrestrained, unserious, 
purely emotive and so to be tolerated but constrained and on occasion 
protected or punished. The minor is technically in the wardship of the 
adult guardian, the parent or parent’s surrogate who acts as the minor’s 
trustees. What, however, of the minor from the space of minority? 
The minor exists nonetheless as the possibility of the major, it subsists 
as the ever present, emotive and unstable space of autobiography, of 
attachment, of an interior sense as visceral memory attached to inchoate 
promise, as image and relationship, fantasy and play. The child, as Freud 
would have it, is parent to the adult, mother to the woman, father to 
the man, and also, in an enigmatic sense, as I am arguing here, the 
unacknowledged author to the law.
Embedded in nascence, in the inchoate and imagistic domain of 
infancy, in the reverie of the body and in play, the child is a figure of 
creativity, a symbol of origin and of invention. That the child has no 
office and is not a person in law invokes an often remarked, distinct 
though limited sovereignty of the infant, a theatre of freedom that has 
as its initial defining features the inhabitation of images rather than 
language, desire as opposed to restraint, and fiction as the mode of 
the real. The knowledge of the child is pure experience in the mundus 
imaginabilis which in classical thought mediates between the sensible 
and the intelligible, and, to borrow from Aristotle, ‘nihil potest homo 
intelligere sine phantasmate’ – without imagination, nothing can be 
understood (1993: 24-26). For there to be law, there has to be desire and 
it is precisely in remaining in desire, staying with the phantasm, that 
promotes passion and facilitates action. It is in that space of fabulation 
that the minumenta of jurisprudence get written and the minor as project 
takes up its juristic place. Homo ludens lies at the origin of homo juridicus. 
Literally, which is here to say in the imagined corpus, and legally, as in 
the materiality of the corpus iuris.
Start with the latter, with youth, image, body and desire in the 
law. Youth is defined by Aristotle as passion, as wanting too much, as 
imagination, image and play which gains a limited legal recognition in 
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the early concept of youths desiring, in love with, or in one translation, 
enthusiasts for law – juventuti cupidæ legum.6 Jurisprudence is for 
Justinian written for youth, for minors, and it is in its classical form 
a pedagogy of institutionalization that channels the desire of the 
student into the art and artifice of the trinity of persons, things and 
actions – bodies, relationships and sacraments, in the theological argot, 
from which the divisions derive. The development of the subject and 
of the institution are parallel rather than different. The model for this 
symbolic permutation or second birth into law is theistically driven: 
‘The most private, the most intimate, that which is at the core of the 
very concept of the subject, to know the fantasm, is already marked 
with the institutional seal of genealogy. Every subject carries within 
him, if I can put it that way, the institution in the primary form of the 
institution of the family’.7 The Law of culture precedes and dictates the 
temporal law. There is, in sum, a doubling of minority and of subjection 
in relation to two parallel authorities, oikonomic and public, private and 
sacred. The latter is instituted in the form of entry into the text, and 
according to Justinian the Institutes were a cradle of the law – cunabula 
legum – opened up for you by the light of ‘our imperial splendor’, and 
so as to instill the principles of a universal legality in the heart of the 
subject.8 Resistance is futile.
The nascent legal subject learns to be a child of the text, meaning 
of the majesty and sovereignty of a divinely promulgated scripture. 
The instituted legal persona is an obedient minor, bearer of a filial fear, 
afraid of hieros and divinity, reverential towards the professors, faithful 
to the laws. It is classically made explicit that it is a crime to play or 
make jokes (ludos) about those who teach the law for the reason that 
‘this material will have been composed by the supreme indulgence of 
the Deity … consecrating as it were a fitting and most holy temple of 
justice (sanctissimum templum iustitiae consecrare)’ (D. liv). Elsewhere 
in the Digest, acting or performing on stage is banned as a crime 
punishable by civil death (infamia), along with brothel keeping as 
another erotic and indictable art (D. 3.2.1).9 Ulpian is later cited to the 
effect that athletes were not performing as actors, and that musicians, 
charioteers and those who administer public games also escape the ban. 
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The latter, the administrators, according to Celsus, are not practitioners 
of the banned and banishing theatrical art because they perform in the 
course of their office (ministerium) and not in the mode of players or 
practitioners of artem ludicram. 
The attack upon the incidents of minority, upon play, levity, jokes, 
upon all unofficial reveries and fabulations is found at the very start 
of the Corpus Iuris, in its minority, as it were, as its minor key, though 
one could equally turn to the invocation of divinity and majesty in 
the preamble to British Acts of Parliament. The transmission of the 
major modality, the white keys, into the common law tradition comes 
again and directly in the insistence upon sombre tone, downcast mood, 
melancholic deportment and proper decorum which is explicit in the 
early modern tradition. The third dictate of the law of nature, according 
to the Stillingfleete’s Irenicum of 1662, is that ‘all things … belonging 
to the Government of Society, be performed with the greatest solemnity 
and decency that may be’ (1662: 93). The ‘evil spirit’ according to the 
same source, is marked by ‘the bleaknesse and turbulency of passion, as 
[also] the faint gleams of Lightnesse and Vanity’ (More 1662: 1 & 15). 
Enthusiasm, according to a source contemporary with Stillingfleet is 
the sibling of atheism and is a distemper occasioned by melancholy, a 
flatuous and spirituous inclination and in all probability excess of wine 
(1662: 96).10 It is the law of solemnity, in any event, that dictates the sites 
and spaces of worship where grave and austere genuflection evidences 
that the appropriate honour and reverence are given to the divinity. 
The same mode and model applies to law in the exceptional form of the 
rules – if such is not too strong a term for these inventions – governing 
summary proceedings for contempt of court.
To understand the modality specific to law one can move from 
the theological dictates of the lex divinae, to the rules of respect, the 
prohibition of levity and requirement of reverence in the courtroom. 
The liturgical character of trial has stringent rules beginning with 
the assertion that ‘the punishment of contempt is the basis of all legal 
procedure’, as intoned in the first modern treatise on the topic by Sir 
John Fox. It is certainly relevant to note the origin and continuance of 
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this primary and radical aura of sanctity and its dictate of ceremony 
that accompanies both the court and its dramatis personae (1927: 1). 
The ban on disrespect – the common law abhors contumacy – and the 
summary punishment of any levity, mockery, satire, and playfulness 
not administered as part of a court office or ministerium, institutes 
directly an atmosphere of gravity, deference of behavior, deflection of 
emotion and suppression of affective relationships. The root, as I have 
adumbrated above, is theological and the early case law confirms this 
in two modes. First, according to Bracton and instantiated in medieval 
decisions on scandalizing the court, the root of this ‘unwritten’ rule, 
this natural law of governmentality, lies in Roman law and specifically 
in the sacred character of all things public. For the common lawyers, it 
is the majesty of the crown, the dignity of the sovereign and the priestly 
character of the judges that institutes the comparably somber affect 
and mode that envelops the spaces and the ministers – historically the 
sacerdotes – of law.11 Contempt of court, contemptus curiae, is contemptus 
iustititiae, and originally incited capital punishment because ‘there is 
no greater crime than contempt … for all persons ought to be subject 
to the King as supreme and his officers’.12
That the institution of deference – one might say of deferring, of 
endlessly postponing minority – is the founding ground of hierarchy 
and a first principle of legal dogmatics can be evidenced by the second 
feature of the law of contempt, which is that it is an unwritten law. It 
takes the form of a structure, a law of nature that is ‘as much a part of 
the lex terrae and within the exception of Magna Charta as the issuing 
of any other legal process whatsoever’.13 The exception referenced was to 
the extant and continuing common law, to which unwritten tradition 
contempt belongs as coeval with the courts themselves, and instituted 
in the indefinite time of antiquity against novelty, which indefiniteness 
has ‘no priority or posteriority to be discovered about it and therefore 
cannot be said to invade the common law, but to act in an alliance and 
friendly conjunction with every other provision which the wisdom of 
our ancestors has established for the good of society’.14 In dogmatic 
jargon, nullum tempus occurit Regi, time does not run against the King 
(Coke, 1629: 273).15 In other words, there is no source but rather an 
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unwritten tradition, an image of the image to be protected, which 
Blackstone captures rather brilliantly in stating that ‘the Judges of the 
Court upon testimony of their own senses, shall decide the point’. The 
example Sir William gives, is of youth, or in the colorful legal argot, 
‘non-age’ as an object of sense that can be tried by inspection and the 
irrefragable proof of ‘ocular demonstration’.16 Size matters. The sense 
of minority makes sense of the minor as something excluded.
In the later case of Almon, the Chief Justice makes an equivalent 
diagnosis, though somewhat differently, in stating that the law of 
contempt requires that ‘homage and obedience [be] rendered to the 
Court’. There is the phantasm of law, in the decorum of the court and 
the regalia and other indications of majesty that attach to the ambulant 
personage of the judges and other ministers of the sovereign. There too, 
in those bodies, lies the site of desire, the world of juridical imagination 
in which the body of the judge accedes to the mediation of the reverie 
of images and the synesthesia of presence. The insistence upon the in 
vivo character of trial and the aura of judicial sanctity plays a crucial 
role, and institutes an affective space or major key into the context and 
interlocutions of the courtroom. A liturgical space is a separate one in 
which rule, life and affect are solemnized and joined together.
The upshot, my point your honors, the trajectory of this outline of 
the control of manners, the dictation of honour and homage, humility 
and minority in the face of law’s liturgical presence is to argue that 
hidden in this office, the minus of the ministerium, the worm in the 
brain of legal being is precisely the persistence of minority, the alien 
desire within, the jurisdictions of other discourses and other laws – 
of space, of love, of movement, of sense, of images, of play – in the 
interstices of legality, meaning in the body that makes and here that 
is devoted to studying, that teaches, which is to say reproduces laws 
in their increasingly diverse forms. It could be argued that a minor 
jurisprudence is written for other legal scholars, that its teaching is 
confined to professors and their doctoral students, to trainee academics, 
the children of Socrates, but if it is to be meaningfully political it 
has also to address body and desire in the training and practice of 
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lawyering. The minor jurisprudence, mos minorum iuris docendi, must 
address the minors.
Quietude, somber dress, melancholic deportment, abstention 
from drink and from sex, avoidance of games, tobacco, drugs; keeping 
early hours, a shaved face, routine and unending study are all express 
desiderata of the early manuals of legal pedagogy in which, as Fulbeck 
puts it, ‘law and religion do lie down together’ (1829: 2). Even up until 
the 9th edition, Glanville Williams’ Learning the Law, a popular text for 
youth desirous to study for a law degree, stipulated that dark dress and 
somber manners were the appropriate decorum of the law student. It 
is not, however, the express representation of the desired somatic body 
and deportment that is at issue but rather the mode of instituting, the 
method of inculcation which disciplines and solemnizes the subject, 
and which above all instills the chorus of juridical emotions. How to 
tear a hole in the cribbed and cabined constraint of legal affectivity? A 
beginning can be made by returning to an early minor jurisprudence, 
the work of a philosopher poet who moved to study law and attend 
the Inns of Court. Abraham Fraunce, in a largely forgotten work on 
legal logic makes the immortal point that the flaw in legal method, in 
the training adopted in the Third University as it was then called, the 
Inns of Court, which were the only place formally teaching substantive, 
Anglican common law, was closure: ‘you would love the law, but sine 
rivali; you would reign, but alone, hinc illæ lachrymæ’ (1588: fol. 3 
recto).17 He found, in this book of logic as pedagogy, that the legal 
discipline was estranged from the university, and its practitioners a 
clique, a rabble of tenurists, that neglected not only method but even 
their own history and concepts as encapsulated in their peculiar diction 
and their misprision of their legal words of art.18
At the root of Fraunce’s critique of the clique, the harpies of the law 
courts, the most unlearned of the learned, is the diagnosis of an error 
in the relationship to legal minors, the students of law who receive no 
adequate education, no viable instruction in the mos britannicus, because 
they study only confused cases in the arduous yet cloistered context of 
apprenticeship and practice in the Inns of Court. Their pursuit of law, 
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of a singular law, of a practice, is rote and venal, a formality and not a 
passion, a means and not an end. The result is likely as not confusion 
rather than creativity, compliance, timidity, and frequently depression. 
Vico can provide further support in his lectures on education where in 
the sixth oration, agreeing with Fraunce, he states of legal study that 
‘here there are tears, here there is misery’ (1993: 126). The immediate 
reference is to parents who force their children into the study of 
jurisprudence to bring honor to their family, and for financial gain. He 
proceeds to argue ‘that as long as the respect due their fathers binds 
them, they continue to pursue those studies unwillingly and with 
disdain and do not cultivate them either seriously or with enthusiasm’. 
Only once the bond of ‘filial devotion’ is thrown off, and only if the 
neophyte persists in law, is there any chance of developing a passion, 
engendering enthusiasm, and having learned nothing the first time 
round, starting again, and learning for herself.19 Only through a species 
of rebirth, a resistance to institutional conformity and the norm of the 
major, of the contemporary version of the law and the prophets, can the 
possibility of playing the jurist, in Olivia Barr’s terms living with the 
law, performing the office of a critical legal scholar, in its necessarily 
minor key, come into being.20 The symbolic permutation has to be 
matched to an imaginary permutation and the minor allowed the 
expression of their affective mode and minority.
Returning to the concept of the minor, childhood is when we grow, 
become and become ourselves. It is the dominion of the imaginary, 
the ius quaesitum alteri, the space of inventively phantasmatic relations 
to the social and the site of prefiguration. There are returns to infancy 
and rebirths, as Vico indicates but the key lies in the attributes of 
origin and origination, novelty and becoming. A minor jurisprudence 
is minor first, as Dorsett and McVeigh’s elegant study of Salmond 
copiously implies, because it is written for and taught to minors. It is 
a pedagogic text for students: ‘The general audience for jurisprudence 
was for the most part students who would take up positions of office 
within institutional life’ (2007: 778). Even here, the trajectory of the 
audience is likely at this stage of development in the main antithetical 
to, if not hostile towards, the minor jurisprudence expounded by 
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the practitioners of minumenta, whose evidencing of law and title is 
through diverse writings, through an interdisciplinary and figurative 
imagination in the apprehension of the alternate realities or plural 
forms of legality. The practitioner of a minor jurisprudence identifies 
with minority and faces various modes of antipathy both from the 
minors, the students, their charges hurrying to office, emplotment and 
employment, and from the institution, for not conforming to the law 
and prophets either in style or in substance. A marginal position in 
the academic institution, escape to adjoining humanistic disciplines, a 
divided identity, isolation or depression can frequently ensue, although, 
ironically it is frequently the passion, the commitment, the enthusiasm 
of the critical legal scholar and the diverse race and gender positions 
that have followed from it that are most threatening and uncomfortable 
in the persona of minority.
Identifying with the minority is primarily what Deleuze and 
Guattari reference as qualifying the status of minor languages and 
minor literatures, although they also suggest ‘ juridical and political’ 
implications. The minor does not exist in itself, but only in relation to 
the major, although this bifurcation is complex in that the minor is 
a deterritorialized language, a literature of the outsider, a continuous 
‘becoming of everybody, one’s potential becoming to the extent that 
one deviates from the model’. For them the minor can become major 
because the essence of minority is ‘a determination different from the 
constant … a subsystem or an outsystem’. 21 This is generally framed 
as some version of the critical jurist’s dilemma.22 For Barr this is posed 
in terms of a choice between escaping the law or learning to live with 
it.23 The latter is interpreted as taking responsibility for one’s office, 
the practice of law. The Swedish jurist and singer Elisabeth Eneroth 
elaborates upon this sense of responsibility, the ethical substrate of the 
critical jurist’s minor role, by way of developing a model for justification 
of action ‘in the sense of care for the reasons for a certain interpersonal 
course of action’ within the ambit of applying the law.24 To Deleuze 
and Guattari’s binaries, reversals, antinomies and dialectical switches, I 
would suggest instead a focus upon this lex caritatis, upon an erudition 
in eroticis, as Nietzsche framed it, one which walks slowly and attentively 
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in the space of amity and desire as they play out in relation to and as 
juridical practice. If the minor is an inconstant state of becoming, the 
unfinished project of a jurisprudence to come, then it implies both a 
‘minorization’ and imagination, the will to fabulation, the autonomous 
gesture of a legal fiction concerned with the not yet, with forces as yet 
undetermined and relationships still to be built.
If the minor is not to be entirely oppositional, if it is to take its place 
as part of the legal institution it requires its own positivity. Critique is 
admirable as far as it goes, as method, as the child on the back of the 
norm, as rectitude of practice, but its tendency is to remain critique ‘of ’ 
rather than substantive expression. To add something akin to an office 
of the minorist, a jurisprudence that is both pre-law and in law, is to 
invoke the radicality of the child, the force of the inaugural in the free 
play of thought. Barr suggests responsibility, and Eneroth advocates 
care and the building of trust through the practice of justification. These 
are facets of a humanistic project and of an equitable orientation, part 
of the spiritualia of office that perhaps gains its exemplary expression in 
the ordo minorum of the Franciscans as recently excavated and expatiated 
by Coccia and Agamben. The object of the order was life itself as the 
first law, wherein living lawfully was the primary dictate of practice: 
rule is life and life is rule being the constituent element of what I would 
propose as an emergent mos minorum.25 Legal precepts become vital 
precepts: ‘A law that is indeterminated into life has as its counterpart, 
with a symmetrically inverted gesture, a life that is totally transformed 
by law’.26 Acting becomes writing, life becomes law.
The mos minorum has the virtue of what St Francis famously coined 
as regula non bullata, meaning rule without papal Bulls, the absence of 
any pontifical authorization, and so a voluntary jurisdiction, persuasion 
through action and not legislation. This means a withdrawal from 
law, abrogatio omnis iuris, in favor of life, in honor of all things in 
common, in praise also of worms.27 The minorization of law into form 
of life, and rule into vital precept also greatly expands the meaning 
and expansiveness of right as a shared or common sense, an all-
encompassing synesthetic openness to the dominion of experience. 
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Jurists, however, are no longer cenobites. The history is important 
mainly for another reason, which is related to the alternate potential 
of minority, the commonality of the child as vital expression and 
as opening through withdrawal, suspension and inhabitation of the 
institution of thought in the mode of singular universality, inscription 
that takes place impersonally, affectively, openly.28
Alongside the cenobitic tradition and the mos minorum of the ordo 
fratrum minorum, there is also the history of the minority of women 
which I took, years ago, in the last flings of love and youth, as the 
exemplum of the minor (1996; 2006a). The voluntary jurisdiction of 
the courts and laws of love offers an opening into a law of imagination, 
a surprisingly contemporary experiential and relational casuistry, an 
amatory set of affective precepts and practices whose guiding principles 
were visceral and libidinal and most definitely regula non bullata in 
that the Tractatus de amore was banned.29 The case where the glossator 
Symphorianus expressly mentions the concept of minor judgments – 
minoris iudiciis – as the apposite definition of decisions taken, involves 
an encounter between lovers in the woods. She was playing with friends 
and he surprised her with a kiss to the hem of her dress. Such was his 
passion and her surprise that she fell to the ground and exposed her 
petticoats. She complained to the court of the Mayor of the Woods 
that the behavior was uncouth and upsetting. She received favourable 
judgment which was upheld on appeal to the High Court of Love (1731: 
47). The judgment was founded on Ovid: who is counting how many 
times I have kissed your clothes?30 The decision was that greater care 
should be taken by the lover in approaching his inamorata. She did 
not like surprises and so she should signal that she knew and assented 
to his sartorial embraces. Passion could follow after honorable amends 
had been made.
The interest, the force as opposed to the credit, of the example 
lies in its imaginative and imaginary character. It creates and opens a 
world, the enduring discourse on the practices and purviews, relational 
intricacies and affective conflicts, the beginnings and endings of the 
amicable and amatory domains that we still inhabit. It is minorist in 
44
Peter Goodrich
multiple senses all associated, or so at least I have labored to argue, 
with childhood, with aspects of childishness here viewed positively and 
actively as the core, the opening of being and so equally, by extension, 
as the libido, the energy in jurisprudence. I will list these facets as a 
kind of manifesto for the child, for the alieni iuris in the sui iuris and 
as the best available indication of possible futures:
1. I am hesitant to put the record straight, for fear of being correct, 
for the lack of seriousness of it, but the subtitle of Law in the Courts of 
Love, was ‘Literature and other minor Jurisprudences’. The minor is 
plural, but who reads to the end of a subtitle or bathes in milk any more? 
Symphorianus also stipulates the plurality of minority, its many courts 
and judgements. In being nascent, in becoming, the child is exuberantly 
several and a jurisprudential office of the minorist is similarly a multiple 
and floating event. No major reinterpretation, no great ark and covenant 
of a Kafkaesque ‘literary continent’, just an enthusiasm for the several 
and a recognition of minor and plural beings. Then decisions have to be 
made. The minor can be radically evil, dangerous, tortured, or open and 
full of aura and potential, fantasm and truth for you. Take your pick.
2. To be done with leaders, with above and below in thought. The 
judgment of love is predicated upon a non-coercive jurisdiction, absence 
of validity, whatever that most dubious of jurisprudential terms is taken 
to imply, in favor of mediation and remediation, the lex caritatis of 
facilitating relationship, trust, amity and amor. Minor jurisprudences, 
the offices of the minorists are here those of acting plurally, of becoming 
ears and performing the auricular tasks of transmitting the demands of 
desire, the passions and enthusiasms of minor causes in the pedagogic, 
tutelary, and practical institutional sites that we inhabit. Gnome for 
the gnomes, as it were, at least as a motto, as an ethically appropriate 
start. The site of judgement, to make the case, lies in the subject object 
relation as the fulfillment of a ligamen, a bond, a love between the 
parties, not one or the other but the phantasm, the ‘nova persona’ that 
is the imaginary product of their conjunction. The object of decision 
is the phantasm seen as the collective site of the union of subject and 
the active intellect.
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3. The offices of minorists are always uneasy because littoral and 
liminal. The art of subtraction, the dilemma of withdrawal resides in 
the institutional dissonance of action. Re-emergence involves existential 
and political exposure, the taking of a stand in thought, facing up to 
being faced off. Joining the collectivity of thought is a dangerous activity 
for a jurist because it potentially weakens the discipline, the brand, 
and reveals the arcana iuris or mysteries of governance as inhabited 
in university settings. The jurists enjoy what in the old language of 
advowson are benefices, livings, and in that ecclesiastical sense seek to 
maintain the separateness of their persona, technically ideona persona or 
proper person, and the justification of their investiture in the benefice 
by virtue of Aetas, Scientia, Mores et Ordo – age, learning, morals and 
degree in law. The minorist, seeking through a moment of withdrawal 
a connection to an earlier or simply different state of disciplinary and 
existential being, the chronological and ebullient theoretical positioning 
before of before the law, has to withdraw, retract so as to uncontract, 
so as to question and thereby inhabit the phantasm of both being and 
being in an institution.
4. The major can be minor because the foetus invariably remains 
present at the heart of being. My favorite example is that of Lord Rogers 
in a case involving the meaning of the word family in the Rent Act.31 
Could a homosexual couple legally be husband and wife? This may 
seem obvious, but the case is initially heard in England, at the end 
of the twentieth century and, as one Law Lord put it, to term a same 
sex couple husband and wife would be ‘to read “black” as meaning 
“white”, [and] is self-contradictory and a nonsense’. To which Lord 
Rogers replies that the Act requires emendation for failing any longer 
to reflect the intentions of the drafters. Their thought must be rendered 
anew and for this it required a return to Selden’s Queen of the Sciences, 
philology, and specifically to a lecture by the poet and Cambridge 
classicist, A.E. Housman on ‘The Application of Thought to Textual 
Criticism’ (1962: 142). Hardly a valid source of law and yet here an 
especially appropriate aid to judgment in its address of emendation of 
corrupt texts. Poetics to the rescue of law, a mixing of jurisdictions 
so as to create a novel application and allow new personae into the 
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web and worms of norms. Housman argues that ‘the prime requisite 
of a good emendation is that it should start from the thought’. Lord 
Rogers, himself a scholar of Roman law, walks through the hole that 
he has cut in the fabric of law, while leaving Housman’s ‘addle-pates 
and impostors’ to maunder and lie. More than that, just to accelerate 
a sense of the ethics of the minor, the emendation of the statute, as 
its wording relates to homosexual partners, is occasioned through the 
textual criticism of a gay poet’s theory of corrupt texts and even worse 
manners. Touché.
5. Minorists are hedonists, that at least is my claim for the sense 
of critical minorism as the opening to expression of believers in the 
enjoyment of thought, the pleasure of joining in thinking as the form 
of life of a discipline outside of any individual ambition, project or 
career. It is the practice of thought, the ambulatory idea, the shared 
character angelicus of the intellect that is the site of withdrawal, the 
point of tension and release. Enthusiasm is the term that Shaftesbury 
begins to expound in a profane sense and as against the pontifications 
and other regulae bullatae of conformism and rote. The minorist is 
true to their Daimon, the outside within, the process of thought as 
attention to phantasms as the objects of intellection, the mixing of 
passion and imagination in the ambulant activity of the academic 
form of life. Shaftesbury tells the story of an itinerant enthusiast who 
was imprisoned and placed in solitary confinement without company 
or light. ‘In this banishment from letters and discourse, the man 
very wittily invented an amusement much to his purpose and highly 
preservative of health and humour … he tuned his natural pipes’ so 
as to form all sorts of ‘articulate voices’ (1999: 128-29). When he was 
released he composed a philosophical treatise on the topic of voice and 
sound. A minor work but one which evinces both the maintenance of 
enthusiasm in compromised circumstances and the will to think actively 
in confinement. An instance of the Well Tempered Clavier, the genius of 
a major composition that alternates in minor keys (Manderson 2001: 
4-21). Don’t stop.
6. I have said much about the attributes of image and imagination, 
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phantasm and enthusiasm as the media of the child, and as the avenues 
of invention, the tools of creative thought for the minorist. These 
aspects of phantasy and play of imagination in thought, of thinking as 
participation in the perambulation of a collective reverie in its various 
modes and inspirations gains another minor expression in the concept 
of fiction or Deleuze’s fabulation. The latter term has the advantage of 
connoting fabrication, figure and making, and suggests a last though 
not lasting image of the minor in Quintilian’s Declamationes minores. 32 
These were in the main exercises, legal arguments as to hypothetical 
conflicts in the future and fictive tense. Potential lawsuits and their 
rhetorical and often humorous argumentation. Pro and occasionally 
contra, but never to judgment. Quintilian taught, in this genre, the 
free flow of future ideas, the passages of thought and their modes 
of advenience. The latter term, adveniences, according to Barthes, are 
points of attraction, images and ideas that ‘set me off’, that advene and 
transport (1974: 19).33 The image that advenes is one that instigates an 
adventure in thought, a haptic and incomplete becoming, the minority 
of an idea helped on its way.
To cut a hole in the fabric of law is to insist upon more than law 
within the institution of legality. The hole, rend or tear that is made 
by the minor, by commitment to minority, thus turns minorist offices 
against the comfort of the constant and the habitus of habit. The minor 
practice exists so as to let the phantasm through the breach and in doing 
so breaks down the abstraction of the legal norm. Figures, dramatis 
personae – same sex married couples, Persian cats, malapropisms, 
allegories on the Nile, long forgotten genders and denizens, King 
Canute, lines and apparatuses – emerge in the space of judicial judgment 
and their accompanying corridors and choral opinions. The minor, 
the child, threatens to make law real and all too human. Alternately, 
precariously, the minor is an ontology in law, a visceral mode of 
occupying an institutional space, a lifestyle in contestation with a form 
of life. As ontology, as minor gesture, singular life, there is a sense of 
resistance, of interruption and of puncturing that veers away from the 




∗ Professor of Law, Cardozo School of Law and Visiting Professor, School of 
Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi. My thanks to my critics, 
Emanuele Coccia, to Adam Gearey, Olivia O’Barr, Chris Tomlins, Rivka 
Weil and the anonymous reviewers for the Journal.
1. I insist on using the earlier edition because I happen to have it, but more 
because modern editions do not reproduce the emblemata that Shaftesbury 
was at pains to include, and also dispense with the typography of the earlier 
editions, as if images and orthography were entirely dispensable to the 
operation of signs. On which, see Felix Paknadel (1974: 290).
2. In addition to Lewis and Short (1958), see Baxter and Johnson (1934).
3. The term minumenta is found in William West (1601) at 192 verso, where 
proof of ownership in Chancery can be through examination of  ‘minumenta, 
scripta, recorda, transcripta, territoria, chartas, ac alias evidentias …’
4. The 1672 edition of John Cowell’s Interpreter [1610] edited by Thomas 
Manley carries the same definition.
5. On the generality or impersonality of thought, drawing on Averroes, see 
Emanuel Coccia (2005) and also Roberto Esposito (2015).
6. This forms the last line of the dedication to Justinian’s Institutes and is 
generally not glossed. See Pierre Legendre (2007); and the excellent study 
of images and childhood by Vicky Lebeau (2008).
7. The concept of symbolic birth is taken from Alexandra Papageorgiou-
Legendre (1990) 56-65.
8.  Institutes Proem.
9. Discussed in Goodrich (2006) s.v. law.
10. Discussed, opposed, ridiculed in Anthony Ashley Shaftesbury (1714) 
63-70.
11. Henry de Bracton, [c.1250] (1958) 127b. The filial fear of law and the 
designation of judges as sacerdotes, as holy men, comes from Sir John 
Fortescue, De Laudibus legum Angliae [c 1460] (1998) though we find it 
in varying forms in all of the subsequent pedagogic texts.
12. Bracton (1958) vol. 3, 368 can also be accessed through http://bracton.
law.harvard.edu/Framed/mframe.htm
13.  The King v Almon 97 Eng. Rep. 94 [1765].
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14. The King v Almon, at 99. (Almon, a bookseller, had criticized Lord 
Mansfield for a decision relating to the English radical and Parliamentarian 
John Wilkes).
14. On the implications of the maxim, see Grenville Sharp (1779). 
Intriguingly, and supportive of Bataille’s theory of the child as sovereign 
in their limited kingdom, it is also a maxim of law that prescription does 
not run against a child.
15. Sir William Blackstone, [1765-69] (2016) vol. 3.22, 218-219 discussing, 
appropriately enough the proofs of the non-age – the minority – of the 
cognizor, ‘or to set aside a statute or recognizance entered into by an infant’.
16. I should note, accuracy requires it, honesty comports with it, that there 
is a recent edition of the Logike which appeared in 2013, edited by one 
Steve Sheppard, but it begins in conformity with my sense: ‘As a matter 
of legal history, the work is now largely unknown’.
17. Fraunce (1588) preface. For more on this theme, to avoid repetition, see 
my ‘A Short History of Failure’ in Languages of Law (1992); and, of course, 
because I mentioned him in the last footnote, Steve Sheppard, ‘Abraham 
Fraunce, Legal Analysis, and Legal Scholarship’, the Introduction to the 
2013 reprinting of a facsimile edition of The Lawiers Logike (Clark, NJ: 
Lawbook Exchange, 2013).
18. In slightly more contemporary terms, see Fiona Cowney (2004) which, 
based on surveys, finds that the primary reason for studying law was to 
please the parents.
19. O. Barr, (2016) 61, defining jurisprudential office as ‘the practice of a 
lawful life’.
20. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (London: Athlone, 1987) at 105. My commentator of choice 
on Deleuze and the minor, an informed and intellective minorist, is 
Edward Mussawir, Jurisdiction in Deleuze: The Expression and Representation 
of Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011).
21. Karlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002) ix: ‘[I]f 
law is a coercive and, at least in this sense, repressive order, how can a legal 
scholar, conscious of this fact, justify her own activity, which necessarily 
contributes to the reproduction of this order?’.
22. O. Barr, Movement, 59.
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23. Elisabeth Eneroth, Critical substantive validity testing of legal norms 
(Stockholm: Jure, 2016) 16.
24. Pietro di Giovanni Olivi, Expositio super regulam, (éd. par D. Flood, 
Wiesbaden 1972) 117: Regula et vita fratrum minorum, vocans eam non 
solum regulam sed et vitam, ut sit sensus quod est regula, id est recta lex, 
et forma vivendi … Cited in Emanuel Coccia, ‘“Regula et vita”: Il diritto 
monastico e la regola fanscescana’ 20 Medioevo e Rinascimento (2006) 97, 
135.
25. Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life, 
86.
26. The root is St Augustine though see also Nicola Masciandaro, ‘Womsign’, 
in Scott Wilson (ed.), Melancology: Black Metal Theory and Ecology (London: 
Zero Books, 2013) 81.
27. Should it be relevant, the notion of impersonality references the escape 
from persona that minority implies and that universality – everyone 
and no one, an escape from the One – dictates. See especially Roberto 
Esposito (2015).
28. For details, see P.G. Walsh, ‘Introduction’ to the translation of the Tractatus 
de amore: P.G. Walsh (trans.), (1993).
29. Ovid, Heroides, 19.31.33
30. Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2001] 1 AC 27 (HL).
30. The most recent translation by Shackleton Bailey, published in the Loeb 
Classical Library, is published as Quintilian (2006).
31. Dynamically recuperated and discussed in David Panagia (2016) Thesis 1.
32. On which, see Erin Manning (2016) 7: ‘This capacity to actualize, at the 
edge of the virtual where the actual is not-yet, is what makes the minor 
a gesture …’
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